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Abstract 
How do wages respond to firm-level idiosyncratic cost shocks? We create a unique dataset that links 
longitudinal data on workers’ compensation to the unexpected costs that UK firms have been forced to 
pay to plug large deficits in their legacy defined benefit pension plans. We show that firms are able to 
share the burden of such costs when a significant share of their workers are current or former members 
of the plan. We also investigate how compensation responds to the closure of defined benefit plans to 
future benefit accrual. We find that firms are able to use such closures to effectively reduce total 
compensation of workers who are plan members. These results point to significant frictions in the 
labour market, which we show are a direct result of the pension arrangement that workers have. 
Closing schemes has an implicit cost for firms since it reduces the frictions that workers face. 
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1. Introduction
There is a growing body of academic work that examines the impact of firm-specific 
shocks on wages. In almost all cases, this evidence relates to shocks to demand or 
profitability that are thought to be plausibly exogenous for wages. There is, for example, a 
large literature in labour economics that has focused on the link between firm profitability 
and wages, often understood within a rent-sharing context. Van Reenen (1996) shows that 
firms that innovate pay higher wages, with innovation being viewed as a good instrument for 
rents. In a similar vein, Kline, Petkova, Williams and Zidar (2017) show that firms that 
generate ex-ante valuable patents – relative to a control group of rejected patent applicant 
firms – share some of the surplus with workers. On average, workers capture 29 cents of 
every dollar of patent-induced surplus. Using a different identification approach, Garin and 
Silverio (2017) examine how sensitive wages are to idiosyncratic export demand shocks 
using Portuguese matched worker-firm data. They find that a shock that reduces a firm’s 
value-added by 10 percent reduces the wages of incumbent workers by 1.5 percent. They 
additionally show that these effects are stronger in industries with longer worker tenure and 
lower turnover rates, suggesting that mobility frictions may be an important explanation for 
these findings. 
This paper adds to the literature by focusing instead on a firm-specific cost shock – 
specifically, a shock to non-wage employment costs. On average, the non-wage elements of 
compensation account for around 20% of total worker remuneration.1 The components of 
these additional costs differ across countries and over time, but key elements include 
employer pension contributions, private healthcare and employment taxes. The focus of this 
1 In 2016, non-wage labour costs represented 17.3% of total compensation in the UK, 18.9% in the US, and 
22.2% in the Eurozone (source: OECD). 
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paper is on how unexpected shocks to the level of one of those non-wage components of 
labour cost are borne by the firm and the workers. Importantly, this cost shock differs 
dramatically across firms and is independent of current employment and wages as it arises 
from historical commitments that firms made. 
The context for our analysis is the dramatic shift in private pension provision and the 
pension-related costs of UK firms over the last two decades. Pensions can essentially be 
divided into two types: defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC). DB schemes 
provide members with a guaranteed lifetime income in retirement, typically a percentage of 
their final or average salary. DC schemes, on the other hand, are like individual savings 
accounts, where the size of the pension pot at the time of retirement depends on individual 
contributions and accumulated returns. Historically, UK firms that provided pensions as part 
of the remuneration package offered DB schemes. At the start of the 1980s, 97% of workers 
in the private sector that were active members of an employer pension scheme were in DB 
schemes. Whilst this figure declined as DC schemes became more commonly available, it 
was still 81% in 2000. Yet by 2015, it had fallen to 29%. Figure 1 shows these abrupt shifts 
in terms of the total number of workers. Interestingly, this is an entirely private-sector 
development – public sector workers have continued to have access to DB schemes, though 
often the generosity of these schemes has changed. A similarly dramatic move away from DB 
schemes occurred in the United States (Haverstick, Munnell, Sanzenbacher and Soto, 2010). 
What has caused this precipitous fall in DB membership in the private sector since the 
start of the millennium? The key to understanding this change is to focus on the assets and 
liabilities of DB schemes. On the asset side, firms (and workers) make ongoing contributions 
to the scheme that are then invested in a portfolio of assets – typically a mix of equities, 
bonds and property. The value of the assets thus crucially depends on asset returns. To the 
extent that such returns are poor, there must be additional contributions from firms and/or 
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workers to achieve a given asset level. On the liabilities side, there are two key elements. 
First, the longevity of workers affects the cost of the scheme, since workers are guaranteed a 
stream of income until death. Second, the discount rate affects the calculation of the present 
value of these liabilities. As the discount rate falls, the present value of liabilities rises – 
sometimes dramatically. 
The last two decades have witnessed a perfect storm in all the elements that make up 
these calculations. Rising longevity, low interest rates that fell further following the 2008 
financial crisis, and long periods of weak equity returns have depressed pension scheme 
assets and inflated the liabilities. As these market risks tend to be largely unhedged at the 
pension scheme level, they have led to a steep increase in deficits and, as a result, firms have 
begun to close their DB schemes. By 2016, 85% of DB schemes were closed to new members 
and 35% were also closed to future accrual of benefits. 
What can firms do under these circumstances? An important point to note is that, as a 
result of pension fund legislation, firms are unable to renege on the DB commitments 
historically made to workers, nor are they able to decide for themselves how to deal with the 
deficit black holes that have developed in the schemes. The rules relating to DB pension 
plans in the UK are currently governed by the 2004 Pensions Act. A key aim of this Act is to 
ensure that DB schemes are funded appropriately given the expected value of liabilities and 
reasonable assumptions regarding asset returns. DB schemes are required to have a formal 
actuarial valuation every three years. This formal valuation determines the funding level of 
the scheme that triggers increased contributions by the sponsoring employer if a deficit exists 
and is unlikely to be eliminated without action. The trustees of the pension scheme must 
negotiate with the employer to establish a recovery plan. The resulting plan generally 
involves a sequence of deficit payments over subsequent years, which must satisfy the 
independent Pension Regulator. 
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The relative importance of deficit payments can be seen in Figure 2. During the 
1990s, the majority of schemes were in surplus and thus required no such payments. On 
average, only 17% of total contributions were for deficit recovery. Since the start of the 
2000s, this has risen to 32% and reached a peak of 42% in 2011. An alternative calculation 
simply asks how much in total has been spent on deficit contributions since 2000. The data 
underlying Figure 2 show that this equals £167bn. This steep rise in pension contributions is 
the main driver behind the sharp increase in the proportion of non-wage labour costs in total 
compensation that we observe in Figure 3 for the UK since 2000. Whilst these substantial 
deficit payments must be made by the firm, it is unclear who bears the ultimate burden: the 
firm, the workers, or both. 
Firms can, however, change the future commitments they make, by adopting one of 
two approaches. First, they can close the DB scheme to new workers – potentially offering 
them membership of a DC scheme as an alternative. However, workers already in the DB 
scheme would continue to accrue benefits under the scheme. Second, firms can close the DB 
scheme completely – to both new and existing workers. All workers could be offered a DC 
scheme as an alternative and no future accrual of benefits would occur. Although closing the 
scheme lets the firm avoid making any new DB pension commitments, it still has to honour 
the commitments already made to current and past workers – it merely avoids making any 
new ones. There are no legal restrictions on firms following either of these strategies. In 
practice, most firms have adopted a two-stage approach. In the early 2000s they began to 
close the DB schemes to new members. As the deficits continued to rise, firms responded by 
closing the schemes completely to future benefit accruals.2 
2 Some firms have also attempted to cap the liabilities related to their past commitments by offering members a 
cash lump sum to quit the scheme entirely. Others have insured themselves, partly or wholly, against future cost 
increases by purchasing third-party insurance. These actions are typically expensive, as the regulator mandates a 
very conservative valuation method for pension liabilities in the context of cash buyouts. 
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The analysis in this paper therefore focuses on two aspects of pension costs. First, we 
explore the impact of the deficit payments that firms are required to make to plug the black 
holes in the schemes on wages. Do current workers bear any of this burden and if they do, 
what share do they bear? Second, we examine the impact of DB scheme closure on workers’ 
remuneration. In a standard frictionless competitive model, in which workers and firms value 
pension contributions in the same way, the elimination of employer DB contributions should 
be matched by either an equivalent rise in DC contributions or a rise in workers’ wages. By 
contrast, a labour market characterized by rent-sharing or by frictions—caused, for example, 
by firm-specific human capital—will generally not give rise to exactly offsetting changes in 
other components of compensation. We investigate both the sharing of deficit costs and the 
impact of scheme closures by constructing a unique dataset that links longitudinal data on 
workers’ compensation to data on the DB pension schemes of UK firms. 
The literature provides limited evidence on how individual wages respond to shocks 
to pensions. Rauh, Stefanescu and Zeldes (2017) examine the second of our two impacts for 
US firms by focusing on the effect of the freezing of pension benefit accruals on total payroll 
costs. The authors find that firms are able to achieve net cost savings by closing their DB 
schemes, suggesting that employees are not fully compensated for the loss of future benefits 
through higher wages or higher contributions to DC schemes. Whilst we find similar effects 
for the UK, our paper differs in two important ways. First, we use worker-level data to 
estimate the effects of pension benefit changes on wages. This allows us to account for 
personal characteristics and individual components of compensation, rather than rely on the 
rather crude measure of average firm-level wages available from company accounts. Second, 
we are able to explore the reasons for this result by providing evidence of substantial frictions 
in worker mobility generated by the pension arrangements. The closure of schemes is shown 
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to alter these frictions significantly and highlights a potential cost of scheme closure for the 
firm. 
Our paper also complements the limited literature that measures the effect of DB 
pension contributions on other firm-level outcomes such as investment expenditure and 
dividends (Rauh, 2006; Phan and Hegde, 2012; Liu and Tonks, 2013; Chaudhry, Au Yong 
and Veld, 2017; Bunn, Mizen and Smietanka, 2018). We differ in our approach by focusing 
on wages and combining firm and individual-level data. Our analysis also has similarities 
with the work of Gruber (1997), whose analysis focused on the wage response to a large 
exogenous reduction in the payroll tax in Chile. Though the reduction was common across 
firms, the effective rate that applied differed across firms depending on the type of workers 
employed. While the legal incidence of the tax fell on employers, Gruber shows that the 
entire gain from the reduced payroll tax accrued to workers through higher wages. In our 
setting, the deficit payments required to support DB schemes are legally required to be paid 
by the firm. However, there is nothing to prevent this cost from being shared ex-post by 
workers. That is what we investigate in this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data 
sources and empirical strategy. Section 3 presents evidence on the impact of the cost shocks 
on wages, whilst Section 4 investigates how total compensation responds when firms close 
down pension schemes. In Section 5 we examine the source of the potential labour market 
frictions that our results imply. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Data and Empirical Strategy
Data 
We have collected data on pension schemes and payments from the annual reports of 
475 UK-listed companies. The sampling frame requires companies to have been amongst the 
300 largest UK-domiciled firms ranked by year-end market capitalization at any point over 
the period from 2000 to 2010. Of the 475 firms, 65% report exposure to at least one UK DB 
scheme – with the remaining 35% having either no pension exposure or only DC schemes. 
For each firm with a DB scheme, we collect annual data from the accounts on: (i) total 
employer contributions, (ii) current service costs, (iii) year-end assets, liabilities and 
surplus/deficit, (iv) the triennial valuations and (v) scheme closure dates if any. This data has 
been consistently reported since 2001 when accounting rules were changed to require more 
detailed reporting of pension exposure. We collect data only on the UK pension exposure 
rather than the exposure to all schemes, as many firms have DB schemes in other countries. 
Figure 4 shows that the trends in total DB contributions in our sample follow a similar pattern 
to those for UK firms as a whole – and account for around one-third of total contributions. 
Our wage data for workers comes from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE). These data are a panel of 1% of employees, sampled randomly based on their 
unique social security number. The survey is conducted every April and the data are collected 
directly from employers’ payrolls, so they are both reliable and benefit from a high response 
rate – response is, in fact, legally required. For our purposes the strength of the data is that 
firms report both gross wages and, since 2005, employer and employee pension contributions 
– as well as the type of pension scheme paid into. We use data from 2002 to 2016, as 2002
was the first year that a firm identifier was included for each worker, allowing us to match 
individual wages to the pension data. 
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To match the wage data for workers to our listed firm sample, we use the Dun and 
Bradstreet code. Of the 475 listed-firms, we find at least one worker in ASHE for 393 firms. 
There are two key reasons why we do not match workers for every firm. First, since ASHE is 
only a 1% sample, firms with small employment levels will frequently not have an employee 
with the relevant social security number. Second, and more importantly, some firms listed 
and domiciled in the UK have almost their entire operation outside of the UK. This is 
particularly true for energy companies. Since ASHE only covers UK workers, such firms’ 
employees will not be in the data. Table 1 provides some summary statistics. 
We need a measure of the deficit payments to capture the firm-level cost shock and 
information on the closure of the pension scheme. The latter is easily identified as most firms 
report the closure date directly in the annual report. The only difficulty is if firms have 
multiple UK schemes and close them at different dates. The ASHE data does not allow us to 
distinguish which particular DB scheme the worker is enrolled in, so we cannot then 
precisely link the closure of a particular scheme to the individual worker. We take the 
conservative approach of using the closure date for the final UK scheme if more than one 
exists. 
Firms are not required to separately report regular and deficit contributions, and when 
they do, the decision on how to classify contributions into the two types is not governed by a 
specific accounting standard. We therefore define the deficit payments that firms are required 
to make to their DB schemes as: 
Deficit Payment = Total Employer Contributions – Current Service Cost 
Current Service Cost is defined as “the increase in the present value of a defined benefit 
obligation resulting from employee service in the current period” (IAS 19). It therefore 
represents the current actuarial estimate of the cost of providing a DB scheme for the 
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financial year for the current employees. It excludes the cost of any re-evaluation of the 
present value of the obligations for previous employees (or previous years of service for 
current employees). If the scheme has been closed to future accrual, the current service cost is 
zero. To assess the accuracy of this approach, Figure 5 shows that for the 111 firms in our 
dataset that do voluntarily break out deficit contributions in their annual report, our measure 
of deficit payments matches the firms’ own classification very closely. Like in firms’ own 
reports, we estimate relatively stable aggregate deficit payments during the early 2000s, 
followed by a steep rise during the financial crisis and an improvement from 2013 onwards as 
more firms close their DB schemes. These trends are similar to the aggregate estimates from 
the national accounts, shown earlier in Figure 2. 
Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical approach exploits the panel nature of the data to identify the effect of 
DB deficit cost shocks using within-firm variation over time. We estimate models of the 
form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 +∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐷𝐵_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡_𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a measure of remuneration for individual i, in firm j, at time t. We control for 
individual- and firm-fixed effects (respectively 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗), and further report estimates with 
match fixed-effects. We also allow for common time shocks, 𝛾𝑡, and a set of other 
observables, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 that control for time-varying individual and firm characteristics. Our 
parameters of interest, 𝛿𝑘, measure the effect on the outcome variable of up to two lags of the 
DB deficit payment measure. To generate a measure that is both comparable across firms and 
easily interpretable, we deflate the DB deficit payment measure by the initial level of 
employment. It is therefore a measure of the annual deficit payment per worker, and the 
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distribution of this variable is shown in Figure 6. It is clear that there is substantial variation 
in this variable across firms. 
To assess the effects of scheme closure, we add an indicator variable, 𝜔𝑡, which 
equals 1 after the firm’s scheme is closed to future accruals, to equation (1). We use either 
wages, employer contributions, or employee contributions as the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
This enables us to measure how the individual components of employee compensation are 
affected by the firm’s decision to close the scheme. 
One potential concern is that the firm’s decision to close the scheme may be jointly 
determined with wages, for instance in response to an external shock. To examine this 
potential endogeneity, we exploit the panel and allow for the indicator variable to affect 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 
both before and after the actual closure date. Letting t = 0 be the actual closure date, we 
estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 +∑ 𝜃𝑘𝜔𝑗𝑡+𝑘
4
𝑘=−4 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2) 
When k < 0, the estimated coefficients 𝜃𝑘 measure the impact of future scheme closure on 
wages or pension contributions and therefore provide evidence on whether elements of 
compensation have a pre-trend for those firms that close their scheme relative to a control 
group of firms that do not. For k  0, the estimated 𝜃𝑘 measure the impact of actual scheme 
closure on the components of remuneration. By estimating separate coefficients for each year 
since closure, we can test whether any effect is immediate and sustained or whether effects 
grow over time. Rauh et al (2017) account for the potential endogeneity of scheme closure by 
using a propensity score matching approach to find “equivalent” firms that do not close their 
DB scheme at the same time. The approach we adopt here is essentially the same since the 
extensive set of controls in the regression, e.g., time interacted with industry dummies, means 
that we are comparing treatment and control firms that are similar. 
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To further address the potential endogeneity of 𝜔𝑡, we assess whether the impact of 
DB scheme closure on pension contributions and wages differs for firms at which scheme 
closure coincides with the triennial actuarial valuation, compared to firms that close their DB 
schemes at other times. The actuarial valuation happens every three years based on a pre-
determined schedule and is the basis for scheme trustees to require additional contributions 
from the firm. Firms that close their DB scheme in the same year as the valuation are 
therefore more likely to be doing so in response to exogenous changes in the funding level, 
rather than as a result of other considerations. This hypothesis is consistent with the cross-
sectional findings of Munnell and Soto (2007) from the US, who find that the firm’s decision 
to close the DB scheme is correlated with the underfunding level. 
3. Firm-Level Cost Shocks and Wages
We begin our results by examining the effect of the deficits on the hourly wages of 
workers. We estimate fixed-effect panel wage regressions as in (1), with ln(hourly wages) as 
the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 2. As we move across the columns 
1 to 4, we include increasingly more controls to test the robustness of the results. Column 5 
then uses ln(weekly earnings) as an alternative measure of compensation available in ASHE 
that takes into account the number of hours worked. Comparing the results across the 
columns, it is clear that the estimates are similar regardless of which control variables or 
specifications are used. This supports the contention that the deficit payments are indeed 
firm-specific shocks that are exogenous to other factors that affect wages. Overall, we find a 
statistically significant reduction in wages as a result of the deficit payments, suggesting that 
firms share some of the burden with workers. 
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We might, however, expect the impact of deficit payments on workers to depend on 
the extent to which the firm’s labour force is exposed to the DB pension scheme. If the legacy 
costs that are being incurred are partly a result of historic promises made to current workers, 
it may prove easier for the firm to shift some of the cost burden than if the costs are a result 
of promises made to workers who are no longer with the firm. This is examined in Table 3. 
We take two approaches. First, we begin by estimating how the impact differs depending on 
whether the workers are themselves members of the DB scheme. To do so, we identify two 
mutually-exclusive groups of workers. The first group are DB members, defined as workers 
who are currently members of the scheme (active members) or have been members in the 
past while working at the same firm (deferred members). The second group are workers who 
have never belonged to the firm’s DB scheme. The second approach is to classify firms into 
those that have large active membership (defined as the proportion of total pension scheme 
members who are still accruing benefits in the firm being above the median) and firms that 
have small active membership (i.e. most of the scheme members have retired or are deferred 
members). The reason for using this approach is that in practice, firms may not be able to set 
wages differentially for individuals based on their pension membership. Columns 1 to 3 
report the results by individual worker pension membership status, while columns 4 to 6 
report the results by active membership at the firm level. Each row in the table reports the 
sum of the coefficients (and associated standard error) on two lags of the DB deficit measure 
for each type of worker. Again, as we go across the table we include more controls to test the 
robustness of the results. 
Focusing on column (3), which reports the impact on scheme members controlling for 
match fixed-effects, measures of contemporaneous and lagged firm performance, and 
industry*year dummies, we find a strongly significant negative effect of the deficit payments 
on the wages of workers who are DB scheme members. In contrast, there is no impact on 
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non-members. To assess the size of the estimated effect, Table 3 also presents estimates of 
the “Sharing Rate.” This is calculated for the current members using the mean level of annual 
deficit payments per worker in the sample (£1,561) and calculated using mean wages and 
hours. It is therefore an estimate of what proportion of the deficit payment is accounted for by 
reduced wages for these workers. We estimate a reduction in wages of around £144 per year, 
implying that these workers pay for about 9% of the deficit costs. The results are similar 
when we consider the wages of all workers at firms with large active membership. These 
sharing estimates are on the low-side of those reported using demand shocks which suggest a 
range of 15-30%. One important factor that differs between these studies is that the cost 
shock here does not relate to the current activity of the firm but to historic liabilities, whilst 
shocks to exports or innovation relate more directly to the efforts of the current workforce. 
Do these magnitudes seem sensible? One way of addressing this is to compare them 
with the share of costs that workers in DB schemes commonly pay in accruals. In general, our 
data show that normal worker contributions to DB schemes account for around 30% of the 
total normal contributions, i.e., current members pay for around one-third of the normal costs 
of a DB scheme. So, an estimate of a sharing rate of around 10% for the deficit payments 
suggests that workers are paying a much lower share of those costs. This is unsurprising, 
given that many of the beneficiaries of the schemes are no longer with the firm, and in any 
case the accrued benefits for current workers are protected by law. 
4. The Impact of Scheme Closure
We now consider the second type of pension shock, namely the closure of the scheme 
to future accrual and its impact on the two relevant components of employee remuneration: 
employer pension contributions and wages. In Table 4, we present estimates of the employer 
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pension contribution rate (as a percentage of gross pay) in which we include a dummy 
variable that turns on when the DB scheme closes. It therefore measures the long-run change 
in contribution rates from closing the DB scheme. Note that after the closure the rate can 
either fall to zero (if the employer decides to no longer offer any pension provision) or to any 
rate that the employer chooses for a DC scheme. 
We distinguish between workers that are exposed to the closure of the scheme and all 
other workers. In column 1, we define exposed workers simply as members of the DB 
scheme. In column 2, we define exposed workers as DB scheme members whose employer 
reported a non-zero DB pension contribution at some point in the past, while in column 3, we 
restrict this definition further to workers whose employer reported a positive contribution in 
the year the scheme closed. Overall, we find that employer contributions fall by 6-7 
percentage points for scheme members, whilst those not currently exposed to the scheme see 
no significant change in contribution rates. The last column restricts the group of exposed 
workers even further to cases where the scheme closed in the year corresponding to the 
triennial valuation. This is to address potential concerns about the endogeneity of the decision 
to close the scheme. Here we see a fall in contributions of 14 percentage points as well as a 
marginally significant negative impact of 3 percentage points on all other workers. 
Table 5 reports identical specifications except that we now have log hourly wages as 
the dependent variable. Given the results in Table 4, we might expect a significant increase in 
wages for DB members when the scheme is closed to offset the decline in compensation 
coming from the 6-7% reduction in employer pension contributions3. However we can see 
that regardless of the exact specification used, there is no evidence of any offset in wages – 
none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero and they are all small in economic 
3  We also estimated models with employee contributions as the dependent variable but these were all 
insignificant – they are available from the authors upon request. 
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magnitude. So DB workers see a substantial fall in total compensation when the firm closes 
down the DB scheme. 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate how the closure of the DB scheme leads to a reduction in 
employer contributions with no offsetting increase in wages, and show that there is no 
evidence that this is because of endogeneity of scheme closure. These figures plot employer 
contributions and wages, respectively, for exposed DB members and all other workers for 
four years prior to and subsequent to scheme closure. Exposed DB members are defined as 
those who received a positive contribution from the firm in the year when the scheme closed. 
The figures show no evidence of trends in pension contributions or wages in the years 
preceding the closure of the scheme or any differences in remuneration between exposed and 
non-exposed workers, supporting the interpretation of the results in Tables 4 and 5. We have 
also examined whether there are different pre-trends in other indicators of firm performance, 
such as profits, revenue, total employment, for treated and control firms and find no evidence 
to support such a concern. 
5. Frictions and Worker Mobility
Our results thus far point to significant costs being borne by workers who work in 
firms affected by pension deficits and scheme closures. These costs generally fall on those 
exposed to the DB scheme and this suggests that frictions for these workers give firms some 
monopsony power. An obvious source of these frictions is the DB scheme itself. Workers in 
final salary DB schemes have an incentive to remain with a firm that continues to allow 
accruals because the pension entitlement generally depends upon the final salary of the 
worker which will grow both because of inflation and real wage growth. If the worker leaves 
the firm today, the final salary will be calculated by taking the current salary and uprating to 
17 
account for inflation only, so any real wage growth effect will be lost. To give a concrete 
example, suppose a worker aged 40 has accrued 15 years of DB entitlement and will retire at 
age 65. Her current salary is £50,000 per year and she does not expect future promotions. The 
DB scheme is final-salary, accrues at the rate of 1/80th per year, inflation is 2% and real wage 
growth in the economy is 1%. Ignoring future accruals, if the worker leaves today, she will 
receive a pension of £15,380 per year from age 65 (which is £9,375 in today’s prices). If 
instead she remains, the pension would be £19,629 (£12,023 in today’s prices) – and this of 
course ignores the 25 years of future accrual. This illustrates the increased mobility costs for 
DB workers compared to otherwise identical workers in a DC scheme, whose pension pay-
out is wholly unrelated to their current or future salary. 
To assess the importance of these frictions – and how they may change when a 
scheme is closed – we estimate probit models of worker mobility. We start with the full 
sample of all workers in ASHE and then focus on the subset of workers in our sample of 
firms. In panel A of Table 6 we present estimates of the marginal effect of being in a DB 
scheme on annual mobility in those two samples. All regressions control for age and tenure 
effects and year and industry dummies. Looking at all workers, being a member of a DB 
scheme reduces the probability of exit from the firm by around 5 percentage points 
(compared to a mean exit rate of 24.5% for non-members). Panel B shows that the effects are 
significantly stronger within our sample of firms, with exit probabilities being about 9% 
lower for DB members. These results point to substantially lower mobility for those workers 
who are members of DB schemes. This is in line with earlier results obtained by McCormick 
and Hughes (1984) and Haverstick et al. (2010) in the US, and Disney and Emmerson (2002) 
in the UK. It is consistent with the lock-in hypothesis and helps us to understand how firms 
can impose some of the deficit costs on these workers. 
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What happens when the firm closes the scheme to future accruals? In the example 
above, the worker no longer gets the added benefit of the real wage growth effect because 
when a scheme is closed, final salaries are computed using the salary at closure date and 
subsequently uprated only by inflation. There is now no lock-in effect – the workers DB 
pension pay-out is identical whether the worker stays or leaves the firm - and we might 
expect to see increased mobility for DB members. Panel A of Table 7 shows that this is 
exactly what happens. The exit rate of those workers who were current members of the DB 
scheme rises by around 13% relative to those who were never members. This is similar in 
magnitude to the estimate of the lock-in from Table 6, therefore suggesting that post-closure, 
prior DB members regain a similar degree of mobility as all other workers who are not locked 
in to the firm by their pension benefits. 
The increased mobility of DB members after scheme closure can be thought of as 
imposing a cost on firms, which mitigates the savings identified earlier. This is because 
greater mobility of workers may lead both to an outflow of firm-specific human capital and to 
additional hiring and training costs for the firm. The cost is likely to be higher the more 
experienced the departing workers are. Panel B of Table 7 assesses whether this is a likely 
concern for firms by comparing the mobility of high-wage and low-wage workers. We define 
high-wage workers as those whose average wage is above the median in the dataset. The 
results show that low-wage DB workers experience a relatively small degree of lock-in prior 
to scheme closure – 6% relative to non-DB low-wage workers – and their mobility rises by 
the same 6% following scheme closure, relative to comparable non-DB workers. The effects 
are much larger and significant for high-wage DB workers, however. The exit rate of those 
workers rises by 18% after the scheme closes compared to similar non-DB workers. This 
suggests that the overall effect of removing pension-related frictions is driven to a greater 
extent by high earners and their pent-up demand for mobility. As the wages of those workers 
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likely reflect high human capital – either general or firm-specific – their increased exit rates 
suggest a potentially significant cost for the firm. 
6. Conclusions
This paper presents evidence on the impact of firm-specific cost shocks on workers. 
Using hand-collected data on the costs of funding historic pension liabilities, our analysis 
shows that firms have, to a limited extent, been able to transfer some of the cost of these 
liabilities onto workers in the form of lower wages. This burden sharing has been limited to 
those workers who have some exposure to the pension scheme, and even in this case, the firm 
bears the substantial share of the cost. However, firms have also increasingly chosen to close 
these pension schemes down in order to avoid incurring additional future liabilities. These 
closures have been associated with significant immediate savings for firms, as they contribute 
less to the replacement pension scheme. There is no evidence that workers are able to offset 
these losses by obtaining compensating wage increases. 
These results imply frictions in the labour market that prevent the standard 
competitive results emerging. To explore these frictions in more detail, we examine the 
extent of job mobility. Importantly we show that workers who are currently members of a DB 
scheme have much lower exit rates than other workers. This effect is distinct from a tenure 
effect – though it is, of course, true that DB workers tend to have longer tenure with a firm. 
This helps us to understand why some of the burden of deficit payments can be shifted onto 
these workers. However, when the firm closes down the DB scheme, we show that this “lock-
in” vanishes – workers have the same exit rates regardless of former DB membership. This 
highlights a risk for the firm in closing down the scheme. Whilst immediate savings are 
made, there will be increased turnover. This is costly to the firm, and maybe more so given 
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that the increased exits of DB workers who are now freed tend to come from the upper part of 
the wage distribution. 
The paper adds to a growing literature on the importance of firm-specific shocks to 
wages and highlights yet again the shortcomings of the standard competitive model for the 
labour market. Frictions are important in understanding how workers are compensated and 
how firms deal with cost shocks. 
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FIGURE 1. ACTIVE MEMBERS OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION SCHEMES, 1979-2015 
Note: The chart plots the total number of workers who are active members of DB pension schemes in the 
UK, by sector and scheme status. Source: Pension Regulator. 
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FIGURE 2. AGGREGATE NORMAL AND SPECIAL PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS, 1992-2015 
Note: The chart plots the aggregate estimates of employers’ normal (regular) and special (deficit) 
contributions to pension schemes from the UK national accounts. Source: Office for National Statistics. 
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FIGURE 3. COMPONENTS OF TOTAL COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES IN THE UK, 1972-2015
Note: The chart plots the breakdown of aggregate compensation of employees from the UK national accounts. Source: Office for National Statistics. 
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FIGURE 4. ECONOMY-WIDE VS SAMPLE DB CONTRIBUTIONS, 2003-2015 
Note: The chart plots the aggregate estimates of employers’ DB contributions to pension 
schemes from the UK national accounts (UK Aggregate) and the total for our sample of 
UK-listed firms (Our Sample). Source: Office for National Statistics. 
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FIGURE 5. DEFICIT CONTRIBUTIONS: OUR DEFINITION VS. COMPANY REPORTS, 2002-2015 
Note: The chart compares our calculation of deficit DB contributions (total employer DB contributions – current 
service cost) to the deficit contributions as reported by the firms themselves, for the 111 firms in our dataset for 
which we are able to extract both measures from the annual reports in at least one of the years.
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FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF DEFICIT PAYMENTS PER WORKER IN THE SAMPLE 
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FIGURE 7. SCHEME CLOSURE AND EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS 
This chart plots the evolution of employer contributions for the period between 
four years prior to DB scheme closure and four years subsequent to DB scheme 
closure, separately for exposed DB members and all other workers. Exposed 
DB members are defined as those whose employer reported a positive 
contribution in the year the scheme closed. 
FIGURE 8. SCHEME CLOSURE AND WAGES 
This chart plots the evolution of wages for the period between four years 
prior to DB scheme closure and four years subsequent to DB scheme closure, 
separately for exposed DB members and all other workers. Exposed DB 
members are defined as those whose employer reported a positive 
contribution in the year the scheme closed. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
A) Firm Sample
Employment 10,361 2,096 27,111 
Revenue (£m) 2,209 327 6,227 
Wage Bill (£m) 297 55 909 
DB Plan (0/1) 0.72 1.00 0.45 
DB Pension Liabilities (£m) 2,094 391 5,380 
DB Net Accounting Deficit (£m) -159 -25 698 
DB Deficit Payments per Employee (£ 000) 2.09 0.84 3.73 
DB Member % 29.86 22.22 30.31 
Sample Size (firm-year obs.) 2,638 
B) Worker Sample
Hourly Wage (£) 13.70 10.19 11.83 
Weekly Wage (£) 479 376 441.26 
DB Employer Contribution Rate (%) 11.79 10.41 10.48 
Tenure (years) 8.80 6.00 8.84 
DB Member (0/1) 0.27 0.00 0.45 
Sample Size (worker-year obs.) 197,748 
Notes: Panel A (Firm Sample): data were hand-collected from the annual reports of the 450 listed firms in the 
sampling frame described in the main text, publicly available from Companies House. The data covers the 
period 2001-2015. Panel B (Worker Sample): data are from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2002-
2016. 
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TABLE 2. PENSION DEFICITS AND WORKERS’ WAGES 
Hourly Wage Weekly Wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
db_emp(-1) -0.085* 
(0.050) 
-0.128** 
(0.056) 
-0.127** 
(0.056) 
-0.087 
(0.060) 
-0.133** 
(0.069) 
db_emp(-2) -0.151* 
(0.082) 
-0.178* 
(0.092) 
-0.171* 
(0.092) 
-0.148 
(0.091) 
-0.175* 
(0.096) 
∑db_emp -0.237* 
(0.123) 
-0.306** 
(0.142) 
-0.298** 
(0.144) 
-0.235* 
(0.134) 
-0.308** 
(0.158) 
Individual FE x 
Year FE x x x x x 
5-digit Industry FE x 
1-digit Industry * Year FE x x x x 
Firm Performance Controls x 
Firm FE x 
Match FE x x x 
Sample Size 197,748 197,748 197,748 158,396 197,748 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages, unless specified otherwise in the column heading. Reported coefficient estimates are 
multiplied by 100. All regressions include age, age squared and tenure. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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TABLE 3. PENSION DEFICITS AND DB MEMBERSHIP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∑db_emp (DB Member)    -0.410** 
(0.163) 
   -0.458** 
(0.179) 
    -0.380*** 
(0.145) 
∑db_emp (Non-DB Member) -0.048 
(0.093) 
-0.025 
(0.091) 
0.143 
(0.205) 
∑db_emp (Large Active Membership)    -0.355** 
(0.151) 
   -0.402** 
(0.163) 
  -0.240** 
(0.116) 
∑db_emp (Small Active Membership) -0.114 
(0.143) 
-0.106 
(0.143) 
-0.180 
(0.328) 
Estimated Sharing Rate 9.8% 11.0% 9.1% 8.5% 9.6% 5.8% 
Individual FE x x 
Year FE x x x x x x 
5-digit Industry FE x x 
1-digit Industry x Year FE x x x x x x 
Firm Performance Controls x x 
Firm FE 
Match FE x x x x 
Sample Size 197,748 197,748 158,413 197,748 197,748 158,413 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings. All regressions include age, age squared and tenure. Each row reports the sum of the coefficients (multiplied 
by 100) for different DB membership at the individual or firm level on the pension deficit measure, which has two lags included in all specifications. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm-level. The estimated sharing rate is calculated by multiplying the estimate of ∑db_emp for DB members or for workers at firms with large active 
membership by the mean hourly wage of £13.70, mean weekly hours of 33.7 and 52 weeks in a year (calculated from the sample of 197,748), divided by 1000 since 
annual deficit payments per worker are expressed in £ thousands. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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TABLE 4. SCHEME CLOSURE AND EMPLOYER PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
All Employer rate 
not zero 
DB rate positive 
in year of close 
Scheme closed 
in valuation 
year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scheme Closed (Exposed DB Members)   -7.679** 
(3.556) 
   -7.407** 
(3.515) 
     -6.542*** 
        (2.103) 
     -14.036*** 
(2.093) 
Scheme Closed (All Other Workers) 0.691 
(1.051) 
1.000 
(0.919) 
       -2.735 
(2.385) 
-2.820* 
(1.542) 
Year FE x x x x 
1-Digit Industry * Year FE x x x x 
Match FE x x x x 
Sample Size 112,497 106,932 112,497 95,090 
Notes: The dependent variable is the employer pension contribution rate (in percentage points). The table reports the 
comparison between employer contributions post- and pre-closure for exposed DB members and all other workers, as defined 
in the main text. All regressions include age, age squared and tenure. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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TABLE 5. SCHEME CLOSURE AND WAGES 
All Employer rate 
not zero 
DB rate positive 
in year of close 
Scheme closed 
in valuation 
year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scheme Closed (Exposed DB Members) -0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
Scheme Closed (All Other Workers) -0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
Year FE x x x x 
1-Digit Industry * Year FE x x x x 
Match FE x x x x 
Sample Size 197,748 106,932 197,748 160,509 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. The table reports the comparison between employer contributions 
post- and pre-closure for exposed DB members and all other workers, as defined in the main text. All regressions include age, 
age squared and tenure. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
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TABLE 6. PENSION SCHEME MEMBERSHIP AND WORKER MOBILITY 
A) All Workers in ASHE
DB Member 0.199 
Not a DB Member 0.245 
Sample Size 1,041,537 
B) Workers in Sample Firms
DB Member 0.177 
Not a DB Member 0.269 
Sample Size 233,362 
Notes: This table reports the probabilities of worker exit based on DB pension 
membership status. The results are based on a probit regression of a 0/1 indicator 
of whether the worker leaves the firm in the next period on a scheme 
membership indicator, as well as controls for age, age squared, gender, tenure, 
tenure squared, year, and 2-digit industry. 
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TABLE 7. PENSION SCHEME CLOSURE AND WORKER MOBILITY 
(1) 
Pr(Exit | 
Scheme Open) 
(2) 
Pr(Exit | 
Scheme Closes) 
(2) - (1) 
Effect of 
Scheme Closure 
on Pr(Exit) 
A) All Workers in Sample Firms
(a) DB Member 0.188*** 
(0.002) 
0.391*** 
(0.022) 
0.202*** 
(0.022) 
(b) Not a DB Member 0.278*** 
(0.002) 
0.348*** 
(0.007) 
0.070*** 
(0.007) 
Difference-in-Difference (a-b) 0.132*** 
(0.023) 
B) Workers in Sample Firms by Position in the Wage Distribution
(i) Workers with Wage ≤ Median 
(a) DB Member 0.208*** 
(0.004) 
0.340*** 
(0.032) 
0.132*** 
(0.032) 
(b) Not a DB Member 0.276*** 
(0.002) 
0.347*** 
(0.008) 
0.070*** 
(0.008) 
Difference-in-Difference (a-b) 0.061* 
(0.033) 
(ii) Workers with Wage > Median 
(a) DB Member 0.179*** 
(0.003) 
0.426*** 
(0.029) 
0.247*** 
(0.029) 
(b) Not a DB Member 0.284*** 
(0.003) 
0.353*** 
(0.015) 
0.069*** 
(0.015) 
Difference-in-Difference (a-b) 0.178*** 
(0.033) 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effect of DB scheme closure on worker exit based on DB pension 
membership status. Column (1) shows the results from a probit regression of a 0/1 indicator of whether the 
worker leaves the firm in the next period on scheme membership and scheme closure indicators and their 
interaction, as well as controls for age, age squared, gender, tenure, tenure squared, year, and 2-digit industry. 
Low-wage workers are defined as those who are, on average, below or at the median of the annual wage 
distribution in ASHE, while high-wage workers are those who are on average above the median. Predicted 
exit probabilities and marginal effects are calculated at the means of all regressors. Sample size is 173,449. 
Deferred members and post-closure periods are excluded from the sample. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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